COSAS QUE NOS HAN HECHO PENSAR II: SEMANA 25 AL 1 JULIO



Aquí va nuestra segunda entrega de algunas de nuestras lecturas de la semana:

«But that boom was, in sizeable measure, also financed from abroad, via capital inflows, as the history of current account deficit shows (see below).

Do those who financed these wasteful investments not deserve to lose money, too? Yet some of them must be among the creditors of Spanish banks who are now to be rescued by the €100bn loan that the Spanish government is planning to take, thereby risking its solvency: this is surely unconscionable.» En What was Spain suppossed to have done? Por Martin Wolf, FT.

«This was an economic policy ‘crime’. It looked cheap at the time, at least under the assumption that there would be no contagion.
A basic moral principle is that criminals must be held responsible for the consequences of their acts, even if those acts are unintended. Eurozone taxpayers are the victims of their elected leaders. They now face the choice between breaking up the Eurozone and paying up. Paying up still is the cheaper alternative, but not for long.» En The Eurozone’s May 2010 strategy is a disaster: Time to pay up and end this crisis por Charles Wyplosz

«Lo que esto significa es que hemos fracasado en gran medida en lo referente a convertir el creciente desempleo tecnológico en creciente tiempo libre voluntario. La razón principal para esto es que la mayor parte de las ganancias productivas logradas durante el transcurso de los últimos 30 años ha ido a parar a manos de los ricos. Aristóteles conocía de la insaciabilidad, pero solamente como un vicio individual, él no vislumbró la insaciabilidad colectiva, esa insaciabilidad políticamente orquestada que llamamos crecimiento económico. La civilización de “siempre más” le hubiese impresionado por ser una locura moral y política.»
En Mano de obra: un paraíso perdido. Robert Skidelsky, en Proyect Syndicate.

«As I just suggested, the architects of the euro, to the extent that they took optimum currency area theory at all seriously, chose to believe that asymmetric shocks would be a relatively minor problem. What happened instead was the mother of all asymmetric shocks – a shock that was, in a bitter irony, caused by the creation of the euro itself.» En Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area por Paul Krugman en NYT.

«As conventionally measured, both Ireland and Spain had responsible fiscal policies during the boom, but they were building up big contingent liabilities, in the form of irresponsible banking practices.» En The end of the euro it is not about austerity por Simon Johnson en NYT

“Fiscal crises tend to lead to political revolutions,” Sargent said last week, over the phone from Europe, where he’d spent ten days travelling in Italy and Spain, for research. He seemed to be suggesting that Europe will need to be turned on its head before it can get back on its feet. “Here you are with over twenty democracies that set their own tax and spending policies,” he said. “All the promises don’t fit together.”
En Debt Derby por Nick Paumgarten en New Yorker.

«Es más, si yo fuese inversor extranjero me preocuparía más el compadreo entre políticos, banqueros y constructores que una eventual quita de la deuda. Pero bueno, igual es cosa mía. Igual es que no me entero muy bien y realmente unas autopistas vacías son un riesgo sistémico. Tanto riesgo, y tan sistémico que hay que recortar en educación, investigación y sanidad antes de permitir que una autopista sin coches quiebre.» En Para el contribuyente, todo es sistémico, por Nuño Rodrigo en Cinco Días

«The euro zone’s fiscal hawks say the bond-buying mechanism will be little different from the existing system. “Mario Monti raised a gun to his head and threatened to shoot himself. In the end he wounded himself in the shoulder,” said one scornful diplomat.» En Less disunion por Charlemagne en The Economist

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